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The John Marshall Journal
Of Practice and Procedure
Volume 2

Spring Term, 1969

Number 2

IN LIGHT OF RECENT
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS,
WHEN IS AN ILLINOIS PROCEEDING
"CIVIL" AND WHEN "CRIMINAL"?
By HARRY G. FINS*
FEDERAL BILL OF RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL CASES

The fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth amendments to the Constitution of the United States guarantee procedural due process
in criminal cases. The Supreme Court of the United States has
established, through a long series of decisions rendered in recent
years, that the protection of these amendments is not limited to
proceedings in the federal courts only - as was previously held1
- but applies also to the prosecution of criminal cases in state
courts.2 Therefore, the determination of whether a particular
*Ph.B., J.D. Member of the Bars of Illinois and the Supreme Court of

the United States. Author of numerous books and treatises on Illinois and
Federal Practice and Procedure and a contributor of articles to various law
reviews and legal publications. Lecturer in the Post-Graduate Division of
The John Marshall Law School (1939-49) and at Lawyers Post-Graduate
Clinics (1949-54). Member of the Illinois Joint Committee on Implementation of the Judicial Amendment (1961-65). One of the draftsmen of the Illinois Administrative Review Act of 1945 and of the 1963 amendments thereto,
and one of the draftsmen of the 1963, 1965 and 1967 amendments to the
Illinois Civil Practice Act.
Until recently, the court had consistently held that the first ten amendments did not restrict the powers of the states, but were intended to apply
only to the federal government. See, e.g., Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90
(1875) ; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) ; Presser v. Illinois,
116 U.S. 252 (1886); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887); Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502 (1915).
2 Fourth amendment - Search and seizure: Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) ; Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) ; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Davis v. Mississippi, 37 U.S.L.W. 4359 (U.S.
April 22, 1969).
Fifth amendment - Self-incrimination: Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968) ; Uniformed
Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of New York, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Orozco
v. Texas, 37 U.S.L.W. 4260: (U.S. March 25, 1969).
Sixth amendment - Assistance of counsel: Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967) ; Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967) ; Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967) ; Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967) ; Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967) ; Mempa v. Rhay,
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proceeding is "criminal" or "civil" is extremely important.

If

it is the former, the state courts, as well as federal courts,' must
accord the constitutional protections; whereas, if it is the latter,
the constitutional safeguards have no application to state court
proceedings.

Recently, the Supreme Court has rendered a number of important decisions which dictate that the difference between "civil"
and "criminal" cannot rest on arbitrary labeling by courts and
legislatures, but must be drawn through careful examination of
legal consequences in order to distinguish reality from fiction.

Indeed, the Court has made it clear that "a State cannot foreclose
the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels. ' 3
PROCEEDINGS FORMERLY "CIVIL"

ARE Now "CRIMINAL"

Juvenile Delinquency

Since the enactment of the first juvenile court statute4 the
states had treated proceedings against juveniles as civil proceed389 U.S. 128 (1967) ; Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968). Speedy
trial: Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) ; Smith v. Hooey 393
U.S. 374 (1969). Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses). Confrontation with witness: Pointer v.
exas, 389 U.S. 400 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965)
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968) ; Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968)
Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968) ; Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314
(1969) ; Shaw v. Illinois, 394 U.S. 219 (1969). Trial by jury in criminal
cases not falling within the category of "petty" offenses: Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) ; Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) ; Dyke v.
Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968). Trial by an "impartial jury":
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510 (1968).
Eighth amendment - Cruel and unusual punishment: Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled specifically as.to
whether the following provisions of the Federal Bill of Rights are applicable
to state criminal proceedings:
Fifth amendment - "presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury" and
"twice put in jeopardy of life and limb": The "double jeopardy" issue is now
pending in the United States Supreme Court, Benton v. Maryland, 392 U.S.
925 (1968).
Sixth amendment - "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation."
Eighth amendment - "Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive
fines imposed."
While application of the excessive bail prohibition of the eighth amendment has not been ruled on by the Supreme Court, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has observed:
We recognized in Pilkington v. Circuit Court of Howell County, Missouri, 8 Cir., 324 F.2d 45, that the excessive bail prohibition of the
Eighth Amendment was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Mastrain v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 711 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965
(1964).
3 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
4 The first such statute was enacted in Illinois in 1899.
Every state
subsequently enacted a similar system. In re Urbasek, 38 Ill.2d 535, 538, 232
N.E.2d 716, 718 (1967).

Can Form Ignore Substance?

1969]

ings.5

Rules of criminal procedure were not to be applied, but

rather the juvenile was to be treated and rehabilitated through
procedures which were clinical rather than punitive., While
such systems professed to protect the juvenile from the harsh
aspects of a criminal prosecution, they also omitted from juvenile
proceedings many of the procedural safeguards afforded an adult
7
defendant in a criminal trial.

.This philosophy was followed by most of the state courts
until in Kent V. United States,8 the Court questioned whether

the admittedly laudible purposes of the juvenile courts were in
reality being carried out:
There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern
that the child receives the worst of both worlds; that he gets neither
the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children. 9
While Kent only dealt with the District of Columbia, the fic-

tion once having been disclosed, this limitation was soon removed
by In re Gault,10 in which the Court held that "proceedings to
determine 'delinquency,' which may lead to commitment to a

state institution, must be regarded as 'criminal' for purposes of
the

. .

. " federal constitutional guarantees.' 1 The Court accented

the fact that "commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will ...

-12

Thus, as the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Heryford v.
Parker13 observed soon after Gault:
It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled 'civil' or 'crimi5 Treatment of juveniles under the various acts was predicated on the
theory that the child was "essentially good" and should thus be the "object of [the states'] care and solicitude." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
Id.at 16.
7In re Urbasek, 38 Ill.2d 535, 538, 232 N.E.2d 716, 718 (1967).
The juvenile courts were originally conceived as a progressive social experiment for treating juvenile offenders in specially designed forums. As such the idea departed significantly from the traditions of
criminal law. The objective was an institutionalized curative device
whereby juveniles deviating from the norms of accepted social behavior could be brought under the paternal protection and instruction
of the state. The state would then provide the proper influences and,
if necessary, a more appropriate environment for the juvenile during
his formative years.

.

.

. The proceedings were to be protective rather

than punitive. A corollary of this conclusion was that protection from
the state was unnecessary, for the state was pursuing the juvenile
respondent's ultimate benefit.
Welch, Delinquency Proceedings - Fundamental Fairness for the Accused
in a Quasi-CriminalForum, 50 MINN. L. REv. 653, 653-54 (1966).
8383 U.S. 541 (1966).

9 Id. at 555-56.
10387 U.S. 1 (1967).
11 Id. at 49.
In Gault, this Court held squarely, for the first time, that various of the
federal constitutional guarantees accompanying ordinary criminal proceedings were applicable to state juvenile court proceedings where possible commitment to a state institution was involved.
In re Whittington, 391 U.S. 341, 344 (1968).
12 387 U.S. at 50.
Is396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
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nal' or whether the subject matter be mental instability or juvenile delinquency. It is the likelihood of involuntary incarceration
- whether for punishment as an adult for a crime, rehabilitation
as a juvenile for delinquency, or treatment and training as a feeble
minded or mental incompetent - which commands observance of
14
the constitutional safeguards of due process.

In In re Urbasek," the Illinois Supreme Court followed
Gault and held that a delinquency proceeding in the juvenile division of an Illinois Circuit Court was a criminal proceeding,
that the preponderance of evidence rule of a civil case did not
apply and that the juvenile had to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as in other criminal cases.
Likewise, in In re Boykin 6 and In re Marsh" the court held
that indigent juveniles found to be delinquent were entitled to
free transcripts for appeal.' The court in Marsh further held
the fourth amendment protection against illegal search and seizure applicable to proceedings under the Illinois Juvenile Court
Act.19
Sex Offenses
In Specht v. Patterson,20the Supreme Court considered Colorado's proceedings under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act,21 which
like the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act 22 had been
characterized as civil, and reversed the Colorado Supreme Court,
14 Id. at 396.
In Heryford, a boy was committed to the Wyoming State Training
School for the feebleminded and epileptic. The boy's mother brought a writ
of habeas corpus contending that the boy was denied his right to counsel and
confrontation. The writ was granted and the State of Wyoming appealed.
The United States court of appeals in affirming, held:
Where, as in both proceedings for juveniles and mentally deficient
persons, the state undertakes to act in parens patriae, it has the inescapable duty to vouchsafe due process, and this necessarily includes the
duty to see that a subject of an involuntary commitment proceedings is
afforded the opportunity to the guiding hand of legal counsel at every
step of the proceedings, unless effectively waived by one authorized
to act in his behalf. Certainly, this duty is not discharged when, as
here, the prosecuting attorney undertakes to 'prosecute the application
[for commitment] on behalf of the state,' and the proposed patient is
not otherwise represented by counsel.
Id.
15 38 Ill.2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967).
'6 39 Ill.2d 617, 237 N.E.2d 460 (1968).
1740 Ill.2d 53, 237 N.E.2d 529 (1968).
18 On the same day, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted rule 661 providing for appointment of appellate counsel and free transcript for indigent
juvenile delinquents on whose behalf appeals are prosecuted. ILL. ANN.
STAT. Ch. ,10A, §661 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
1' 40 Ill.2d at 53, 55, 237 N.E.2d at 529, 531 (dictum).
20386 U.S. 605 (1967).
21 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§39-19-1 39-19-10 (1967).
22 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §105-3.01 (1967).
This section provides:
The proceedings under this Act are civil in nature. The provisions of the Civil Practice Act including the provisions for appeal,
and all existing and future amendments of that Act and the rules now
or hereafter adopted pursuant to that Act shall apply to all proceedings
hereunder except as otherwise provided in this Act.

1969]
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holding that a proceeding against a person with sexually aggressive tendencies is a criminal case protected by the Federal Constitution.2 3 The Court reasoned that the deprivation of liberty
by confinement "is criminal punishment even though it is to keep
' '2 4
individuals from inflicting future harm.
Although the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act 2 5 calls
the proceedings civil, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v.
Capoldi26 stated:
We have held in proceedings and under the Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act that a defendant must be accorded the same procedural
safeguards available to an accused 2in
a criminal trial even though
7
the proceedings are civil in nature.
More significantly, the Illinois Appellate Court in People V.
Potter2 cited and followed Spechkt, observing:
This is a status determination. Call them civil commitments if you
will, nevertheless, their end result is incarceration for an indeterminate time and until there is a probationary discharge or a final
discharge based on recovery from the mental disorder.

.

.

.

Jus-

tice . . . dictates that such confinement
shall be only in proper
29
cases and only in a proper manner.
23 386 U.S. at 608-09.

Specht had been convicted under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §40-2-32 (1963)
for indecent liberties under which the maximum sentence was ten years. He
was sentenced, however, in accordance with a procedure under the Colorado
Sex Offenders Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §39-19-1 - 39-19-10 (1963),
which provided for an indefinite term from one day to life without notice or
full hearing.
Thus, the precise question presented, as stated by the Court, was whether
the holding of Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), that in determining the sentence of a convicted person the due process clause did not
require a hearing nor the right of participation of the convicted in any such
hearing that was held, was controlling.
The Specht court refused to extend Williams to the "radically different
situation" before it and held these proceedings were subject to the requirements of both the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. 386 U.S. at 608. The Court reasoned that the commission of
the enumerated crime was not the basis of sentencing, but was, under the
Sex Offenders Act, the basis for commencing a new proceeding, a new finding of fact, not a part of the charged offense, namely, "whether a person
constitutes a threat of bodily harm to the public, or is an habitual offender
and mentally ill." Id. Thus, such a proceeding "whether denominated civil
or criminal" had to meet constitutional safeguards since the punishment under the new finding was "criminal punishment," deprivation of liberty by
confinement, "even though it is to keep individuals from inflicting future
harm." Id. at 608-09.
24 386 U.S. at 608-09.
25 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §105-3.01 (1967).
26 37 Ill.2d 11, 225 N.E.2d 634 (1967).
27 Id. at 15, 225 N.E.2d at 637 (emphasis added).
28 85 Ill. App. 2d 151, 228 N.E.2d 238 (1967).
29 Id. at 154, 228 N.E.2d at 240.
The court concluded that "[t]he end result under our Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, is incarceration for an indeterminate period of time and
is against one's will," and that, therefore, the Miranda safeguards had to be
followed in such proceedings with respect to in-custody interrogation. Id. at
156, 228 N.E.2d at 241.
A sequel to People v. Potter is People v. Kennedy, 101 Ill. App. 2d 91,
242 N.E.2d 278 (1968). The court said: "The deficiencies that we found to
exist in Potter exist here, and if the rules for criminal appeals apply, we
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Revocation of Probation
Prior to 1967, a proceeding for the revocation of probation
had been held to be "civil."' In Mempa v. Rhay,31 the United

States Supreme Court held that in a proceeding to revoke probation, the defendant had a right to assistance of counsel under
the sixth amendment. Thus, the Supreme Court determined that
32
revocation of probation is a "criminal," not a "civil" proceeding.
have jurisdiction and under Potter must reverse the remand." 101 Ill. App.
2d at 94; 242 N.E2d at 280. However, the Kennedy case encountered the
following procedural problem on appeal. On March 3, 1967, the trial court
found the defendant to be a sexually dangerous person and entered an order
committing him to the custody of the Director of the Department of Public
Safety. No notice of appeal was filed within the regular 30-day appeal
period. On August 17, 1967, more than 5h months after the entry of the
order, the defendant wrote a letter seeking leave to appeal. The appellate
court treated the letter as a petition for leave to appeal and, under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 606(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §606(c) (1967), allowed the defendant to file his notice of appeal.
There is a procedural difference in Illinois as to late appeals in civil
and criminal cases. In civil cases, application to the reviewing court must
be made within 30 days after the expiration of the time for the filing of a
notice of appeal, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §303(e) (1967), whereas in
criminal cases, the application to the reviewing court may be made within
six months after the expiration of the time for the filing of the notice of
appeal, ILL REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §606(c) (1967).
The Kennedy court concluded as follows:
Rule 303(e), effective January 1, 1967, does apply and since the petition
for leave to appeal here was filed more than sixty days after the March 3
order, we are without jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal and our
order granting leave to appeal was in error. The State's motion to
dismiss the appeal must be allowed.
• . . In our judgment, however, the issues here involved are of sufficient
public interest and of sufficient importance that we should on our own
motion grant a certificate of importance, and it is so ordered.
101 Ill.
App. 2d at 94-95, 242 N.E.2d at 280-81.
It is of interest to observe that the procedure for obtaining a certificate
of importance is provided for in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 316, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A, §316 (1967), which rule requires an "application" and does
not provide for the granting of such certificate on the court's own motion.
Research does not disclose any other Illinois case where a certificate of importance was 'granted on the appellate court's own motion without an application.
The case of People v. Kennedy is now pending in the Supreme Court
of Illinois under Docket No. 41848. The Supreme Court is thus faced with
the direct and blunt question - is a proceeding under the Illinois Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act "civil" or "criminal"?
3
0 See generally H. FINS, ILLINOIS COURT PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW
JUDICIAL ARTICLE 163-64 (1967) [hereinafter cited FINS].
31389 U.S. 128 (1967).
32 It
is interesting to note that although the "civil" - "criminal" question was not expressly raised, the Court, impliedly, again held that regardless of whether it be denominated civil or criminal, the protection of the
sixth amendment was applicable.
After conviction, the petitioners had been placed on probation and the
imposition of sentence had. been deferred pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE
§§9.95.200, 9.95.210 (Supp. 1968). At subsequent hearings for revocation
of probation, the alleged denials of counsel occurred.
The state contended that the petitioners had been sentenced at the time
of probation and that the imposition of the sentence following revocation of
probation was merely a formality - thus, the suggestion that the proceeding was not criminal in nature. The Court, however, pointed out:
[A]s happened in these two cases, the eventual imposition of sentence
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In People v. Coffman,3 3 decided on June 1, 1967, the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed the judgment of the trial court on
the basis of lack of due process because the defendant was not
represented by counsel in a proceeding for the revocation of
probation.
In this sphere, the Supreme Court of the United States
(which reviewed a case from the State of Washington) and the
Appellate Court of Illinois reached their respective conclusions
independent of each other, but the result is the same.
Forfeiture Proceeding
4
In Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,3
the Supreme Court reversed a Pennsylvania decision involving a forfeiture proceeding
deemed civil in nature by the Pennsylvania court 35 and held that
the federal constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures applied to state forfeiture proceedings.3 6
The Court held that "proceedings instituted for the purpose of
declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are

in their nature criminal.

3

7

The Court reasoned:

Its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law. . . . In this forfeiture
proceeding he was subject to the loss of his automobile, which at
the time involved had an estimated value of approximately $1000,
a higher amount than the maximum fine in the criminal proceeding.
It would be anomalous indeed, under these circumstances, to hold
that in the criminal proceeding the illegally seized evidence is excludable, while in the forfeiture proceeding, requiring the determination that the criminal law has been violated, the same evidence
would be admissible. That the forfeiture is clearly a penalty for
the criminal offense and can result in even greater punishment than
the criminal prosecution
has in fact been recognized by the Penn38
sylvania courts.

on the prior plea of guilty is based on the alleged commission of offenses for which the accused is never tried.
389 U.S. at 136-37.
Thus, the Court apparently was suggesting the same new finding of
fact theory as was stated in Specht, which finding of fact could lead to
confinement.
All we decide here is that a lawyer must be afforded at this proceeding
whether it be labeled a revocation of probation or a deferred sentencing.
Id. at 137.
On October 14, 1968, the Supreme Court held Mempa v. Rhay to be
retroactive, McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968).
3383 Ill. App. 2d 272, 227 N.E.2d 108 (1967).
34 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
35Id.at 695.
Likewise, prior to 1965, a proceeding for the forfeiture, destruction,
disposition or recovery of property seized or confiscated as contraband was
considered by the Illinois courts as "civil." See generally FINS at 160-61.
36 380 U.S. at 696.
37 Id. at 697.
38Id. at 700-01.
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Municipal Ordinance Violation
The Supreme Court has held that, as a matter of federal
constitutional law, a prosecution under a municipal ordinance is
3
a "criminal" case.
In Camarav. Municipal Court,4° the Court held that enforcement of a municipal ordinance which may result in the imposition of a fine or imprisonment is a criminal case protected by the
Federal Constitution as such. 41 The Supreme Court of the United
States overruled its earlier decisions 42 and the California Court
of Appeals which had held that a city ordinance "is part of a
regulatory scheme which is essentially civil rather than crimiPal."' 4 1 The Court stated that "[iin this case, the appellant
[defendant below] has been charged with a crime," 44 and referred to the proceeding as one "enforced by criminal processes,"
by a "criminal complaint," constituting "a criminal offense"45 and
was "a crime, punishable by fine or even by jail sentence.
In See v. City of Seattle,46 decided by the Supreme Court on
the same day as Camara, the defendant was fined $100.00 for
39 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). Both the above cases were decided on June 5,
1967.
40 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
41 In Camara, appellant was charged with refusing to permit a lawful
inspection of his leased premises under section 507 of the San Francisco
Municipal Code which provides in relevant part:
Any person . . . who violates . . . or who resists or opposes the
execution of any of the provisions of this Code . . .shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor . . . [punishable] by a fine not exceeding five hundred
dollars . . . or by imprisonment, not exceeding six (6) months or by
both ...

387 U.S. at 527, n. 2.
Inspectors from the San Francisco Department of Health had attempted
several times to inspect the premises without a warrant, and each time the
appellant refused to allow such inspection. The inspections were authorized
under section 503 of the San Francisco Municipal Code which authorized
certain employees, upon presentment of proper credentials, to enter any
building, at reasonable times, "to perform any duty imposed upon them by
the Municipal Code." Id. at 526.
45 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) ; Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price,
364 U.S. 263 (1960). Both cases upheld convictions for refusal to permit
inspections without warrants.
However, as the Camaracourt prefatorily noted:
Since those closely divided decisions, more intensive efforts at all levels
of government to contain and eliminate urban blight have led to increasing use of such inspection techniques, while numerous decisions of
this Court have more fully defined the Fourth Amendment's effect on
state and municipal action. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643; Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23. In view of the growing nationwide importance
of the problem, we noted probable jurisdiction in this case and in See
v. City of Seattle, post, to re-examine whether administrative inspection
programs, as presently authorized and conducted, violate Fourth Amendment rights as those rights are enforced against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 385 U.S. 808.
387 U.S. at 525.
43 387 U.S. at 528.
44Id. at 540.
45 Id. at 531.
46 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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the violation of a city ordinance and the fine was suspended.
The Court reversed the conviction, and, following the abovediscussed Camara case, held that it was a criminal case pro47
tected by the Federal Constitution as such.
In Village of Park Forest v. Bragg,48 amici curiae urged
the Supreme Court of Illinois to follow the above-discussed
Camara and See cases, but the Illinois Supreme Court neither followed nor cited these decisions of the United States Supreme
Court and persisted in relying upon earlier Illinois decisions of
the pre-Camara and See period, holding that a prosecution for
the violation of a municipal ordinance was a "civil" case. 9
However, in City of Chicago v. Thomas,o decided on November 7, 1968, which involved "the assessment of fines for
violation of municipal ordinances, ' 5 1 the argument was advanced
that the proceeding was "civil." The court referred to Village
of Park Forest v. Bragg, and said: "An analysis of the Illinois
authorities which have dealt with the problem of classifying
such proceedings reveals the conceptual difficulty encountered in
attempting to so classify these cases. 15 2 The court concluded
that "t] here can be no dispute that fines such as the fine imposed in the instant case have a punitive purpose . . . " and
that "the criminal nature inherent in such actions" predomi4
nates.5
In Recznik v. City of Lorain,5 the defendant-petitioner was
convicted of violating city gambling ordinances. The majority
opinion said:
Since we have concluded that the petitioner's rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution were
4 As stated by the See Court: "The only question which this case presents is whether Camara applies to similar inspections of commercial structures which are not used as private residences." Id. at 542.
In Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), the Supreme Court
of the United States said:
[I]t is now beyond question that a State's political subdivisions must
comply with the Fourteenth Amendment [citing in the footnote, among
other cases, See v. City of Seattle]. The actions of local government
are the actions of the State.
Id. at 480.
48 38 Ill.2d 225, 230 N.E.2d 868 (1967).

49

In Bragg, the question was raised whether after conviction for viola-

tion of a municipal ordinance, the judge had the power to suspend the penalty
he had assessed. Initially, however, the court was faced with the problem of
whether the Village could properly seek review of the magistrate s decision.
This question turned on whether ordinance violation proceedings were civil
or criminal in nature. The court, admitting the hybrid nature of the proceeding, held the decision properly reviewable. 38 Ill.2d at 228-29, 230

N.E.2d at 870.
50 102 Ill. App. 2d 143, 243 N.E.2d 572 (1968).
51 Id. at 145, 243 N.E.2d at 573.
52 Id. at 150, 243 N.E.2d at 576.
5

54

Id. at 150, 243 N.E.2d at 575.

1d. at 151, 243 N.E.2d at 576.
55393 U.S. 166 (1968).
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infringed by the entry of the police unto his premises, we grant
certiorari and reverse 6

The minority opinion held "that an officer seeing a person committing a misdemeanor, has a duty to arrest" and that the officer
did not lack "probable cause to arrest for the misdemeanors he
actually saw committed. ' 57 Thus, both the majority and minority
opinions treated the city ordinance violations as criminal cases

without the slightest equivocation."
Disciplinary Proceeding
In Spevack v. Klein,59 a request was made that Spevack, a
New York lawyer, produce his records in a disciplinary proceeding. Spevack refused to comply with this request, contending
that if he produced his records, the evidence might show that he
was involved in soliciting which would result in the deprivation
of his right to earn a livelihood through the practice of law. The
Supreme Court held that depriving a lawyer of the right to
practice law constitutes a "penalty" ' 0 and is, therefore, protected
by the fifth amendment which provides that "[n]o person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."6'
In so holding, the Court had to conclude that a disciplinary proceeding, which may result in the penalty of revocation of a license to practice a trade or profession, is a "criminal case," for otherwise there would be no occasion to apply the
fifth amendment prohibition against self-incrimination in "any
criminal case."62 It is, therefore, clear that the holding of Spe56
Id. at 168.
57
Id. at 174 (emphasis added).
58 In Williams v. Oklahoma City, 439 P.2d §965 (Ct. Crim. App. Okla.),
cert. granted, 393 U.S. 998 (1968), the defendant was prosecuted for the
violation of a municipal ordinance of Oklahoma City. He was found guilty
and sentenced to ninety days in jail, and fined $50.00. The defendant had a
wife and eleven children and worked as a hospital janitor, earning $55.00 per
month. The trial court made a finding that the defendant was indigent, and
that review could not be had without a transcript of the evidence, which the
defendant could not afford to purchase. The trial court denied the defendant's request that he be supplied with a transcript of the evidence, free
of charge, because there is no statute authorizing such relief in Oklahoma.
The defendant filed an original petition for mandamus in the reviewing
court, which tribunal ruled that the decision of the trial court was correct,
and denied the writ. On December 16, 1968 the Supreme Court of the
United States granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and granted certiorari. The case is now pending on the appellate docket of the United States
Supreme Court.
59385 U.S. 511 (1967).
60 Id. at 514-15.
61 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
62 Id. (emphasis added). It must not be overlooked that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination may come into play in criminal
cases, civil cases, administrative hearings, congressional investigations and
proceedings of all kinds because a self-incriminating statement which is made
in a civil case or in any other proceeding may result in the disclosure of
evidence either supporting criminal prosecution or leading to evidence which
would support criminal prosecution of the person who makes the statement,
thereby resulting in self-incrimination. In the Spevack case, the only ill
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vack v. Klein is that a disciplinary proceeding is a "criminal
63
case.,'
Since the Spevack decision, the Supreme Court has set aside
other judgments in disciplinary proceedings in light of Spevack.
In one such case, Kaye v. Coordinating Committee,64 the highest court of New York had upheld the disbarment of Louis
Kaye, 5 stating:
Disciplinary proceedings are not criminal proceedings, and the
'refusal to testify raises the legal presumption of the truth of these
facts, which must have been known to defendant, and which he
failed to contradict.'66
In Zuckerman v. Greason,7 the New York court upheld the
disbarment of Landon Zuckerman,6 the respondent having been
found guilty of the submission of misleading, exaggerated and
false medical bills and statements covering lost time and earnings for insurance purposes, building up medical bills by referring claimants to a succession of doctors and using investigators
to obtain signed retainers, to obtain statements from parties
represented by attorneys and to obtain signatures on blank forms
for appointment of guardians ad litem. However, the New
York court also took into consideration the fact that:
[R]espondent, Zuckerman, deliberately refused to cooperate with
the court in its efforts to expose unethical practices and to determine whether he had committed any acts of professional misconduct which destroyed the character and fitness required of him as a
condition to his retention of the privilege of remaining a member
of the Bar.60
As in Kaye, the United States Supreme Court vacated the disbarment judgment and remanded the case to the New York court
for reconsideration in light of Spevack v. Klein.
In In re Damisch,7 0 the Supreme Court of Illinois followed
Spevack in holding that a disciplinary proceeding involved "puneffect on the lawyer would have been that his statement would lead to disbarment, which "is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer," In re
Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968), and therefore "criminal" in effect.
63 Prior to Spevack, disciplinary proceedings, such as disbarment of an
attorney, were generally regarded as civil in nature rather than criminal.
Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961). See, e.g., Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S.
265 (1882) ; Keithley v. Stevens, 238 Ill. 199, 87 N.E. 375 (1909).
For a view that the Spevack decision did not convert a disciplinary proceeding into a "criminal" case, see Franck, The Myth of Spevack v. Klein, 54
A.B.A.J. 970 (1968). See also In re Damisch, 38 Ill.2d 195, 230 N.E.2d 254
(1967), where lip service was paid to the shiboleth that "a disciplinary pro-

ceeding is not a criminal prosecution and is not subject to all the rules that
govern such a case." 38 Ill.2d at 206, 230 N.E.2d at 260.
64386 U.S. 17 (1967).
65
1n 'e Kaye, 24 App. Div. 2d 345, 266 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1966).
66 Id. at 347, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
67

386 U.S. 15 (1967).

68 In re Zuckerman, 23 App. Div. 2d 825, 259

69 Id. at 825, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
70 38 Ill.2d 195, 230 N.E.2d 254 (1967).

N.Y.S.2d 963 (1965).
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ishment"7 1 but persisted in relying upon earlier Illinois decisions
of the pre-Spevack period in holding:
[A] disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal prosecution and is
not subject to all the rules that govern such a case. E.g., In re
Anderson, 370 Ill. 515, 522; In re Needham, 364 Ill. 65, 68.12

In In re Ruffalo, 73 the latest Supreme Court case in this area,
the Court stated that "[d]isbarment, designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer.

are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature.

...

'74

These

FEDERAL TEST APPLICABLE BY VIRTUE OF
SUPREMACY CLAUSE

Article VI of the Constitution of the United States provides
part:
in
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . .
shall be the supreme law of the Land; and the Judges in every
or
State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution
75
Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

Therefore, it
the decisions
If
(1)
one's
against

(2)

is submitted that the following tests set forth in
of the Supreme Court of the United States apply:
the proceeding may result in the "incarceration
76
will," it is a "criminal" proceeding.

If the proceeding may result in the imposition of a
77

fine, it is a "criminal" proceeding.
If the proceeding may result in the deprivation of a
(3)
privilege or the revocation of a license which is the means of
earning a livelihood, it involves the imposition of a "penalty" and
78
is a "criminal" proceeding.
GREAT CHANGES ON THE HORIZON

In light of the above discussed federal constitutional develId. at 206, 230 N.E.2d at 260.
38 Ill.2d at 206, 230 N.E.2d at 260.
The Anderson case was decided in 1939 and Needham in 1936, more
than a quarter of a century before the decision in Spevack.
The Damisch case was not, and, in the opinion of this writer, could not
be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, as the Illinois court said:
"We conclude that the appropriate disciplinary measure in this instance is
censure, and it is so ordered." 38 Ill.2d at 209, 230 N.E.2d at 262. An
order of censure is merely an expression of the court's "displeasure" with
the respondent's conduct, but it does not deprive the respondent of liberty,
property, or the right to earn a livelihood in his chosen profession. It is,
therefore, not a "judgment" which is reviewable by the Supreme Court of
the United States. (Research has not disclosed a case directly in point).
71

72

73 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
74

Id.

at 550-51.

75 U.S. CONST. art.

VI.

Specht v. Patterson, 3867 U.S. 605'(1967) ; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
77 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) ; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
78 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) ; Kaye v. Coordinating Comm'n,
386 U.S. 17 (1967) ; Zuckerman v. Greason, 386 U.S. 15 (1967).
76
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opments, certain proceedings must be re-examined from a realistic point of view detached from the fictional labels which tri79
bunals and legislatures have heretofore applied to them.
Post-Conviction: Prior to 1967, a post-conviction proceeding was treated as "civil" in nature. 0 But since the proceeding
may result in "incarceration against one's will," it ought to be
treated as "criminal" under the Specht, Gault, and Mempa test.
In this connection it should be noted that in Lane v. Brown 8' the
United States Supreme Court treated a post-conviction proceeding as "criminal." Likewise, the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing
Act 2 has codified the defendant's right to counsel at a post-conviction hearing by providing that:
If the petitioner is without counsel and alleges that he is without
means to procure counsel, he shall state whether or not he wishes
counsel to be appointed to represent him. If appointment of counsel is so requested, the Court shall appoint counsel if satisfied that
83
the petitioner has no means to procure counsel.
In 1968, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed many trial
court decisions, in post-conviction proceedings, for lack of assistance of counsel. 84 Furthermore, Rule 651 (c) and (d) 5 of the
Supreme Court of Illinois, effective January 1, 1967, as amended
December 14, 1968, effective January 1, 1969, provides:
Upon the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a post-conviction
proceeding, if the trial court determines that the petitioner is indigent, it shall order that a transcript of the record of the postconviction proceedings, including a transcript of the evidence, if
any, shall be prepared and filed with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court and shall appoint counsel on appeal, both without cost to the

petitioner, [and] [t]he procedure for an appeal in a post-conviction
proceeding shall be in accordance with the rules governing criminal
appeals, as near as may be.8 6
Extradition: Prior to 1967, a habeas corpus proceeding
, For a collection of numerous authorities under the sub-title of "Civil
Cases Related to Criminal Proceedings" see FINS at 160-66.
80 E.g., McKeag v. People, 7 Ill.2d 586, 131 N.E.2d 517 (1956); People
v. Dolgin, 6 I1l.2d 109, 126 N.E.2d 681 (1955); People v. Hryciuk, 5 11.2d
176, 125 N.E.2d 61 (1954).
81 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
82ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §122-4 (1967).
83 Id.
84 People v. Polansky, 39 Ill.2d 84, 233 N.E.2d 374 (1968) ; People v.

Hunt, 39 Ill.2d 107, 233 N.E.2d 408 (1968) ; People v. Wilson, 39 Ill.2d 275,
235 N.E.2d 561 (1968) ; People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill.2d 278, 235 N.E.2d 566
(1968); People v. King, 39 Ill.2d 295, 235 N.E.2d 585 (1968); People v.
Smith, 39 Ill.2d 581, 237 N.E.2d 458 (1968); People v. Tyner, 40 Ill.2d 1,
238 N.E.2d 377 (1968); People v. Barnes, 40 Ill.2d 383, 240 N.E.2d 586
(1968); People v. Butler 40 Il 2d 386, 240 N.E. 592 (1968); People v.
Craig, 40 Il1.2d 466, 240 N.E.2d 588 (1968); People v. Ford, 40 Ill.2d 440,
240 N.E.2d 620 (1968); People v. Terry, 40 Ill.2d 547, 240 N.E.2d 657
(1968) ; People v. Wilson, 40 Ill.2d 378, 240 N.E.2d 583 (1968): People v.
Neber, 41 Ill.2d 126, 242 N.E.2d 179 (1968); People v. Capron, 41 Ill.2d
234, 242 N.E.2d 244 (1968).
85 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §651(c) & (d)
(1967).
8 Id. (emphasis added).
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under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act 87 was deemed
"civil."8
But, once again, since the proceeding may result in

"incarceration against one's will," it ought to be treated as
"criminal" under the Specht, Gault and Mempa test.
In the recent case of People ex rel. Harris V. Ogilvie,89 the
Illinois Supreme Court reversed an extradition proceeding because the trial court refused to appoint counsel for the indigent
prisoner in the habeas corpus proceeding testing the legality of
the arrest on the governor's warrant. However, the court
avoided a direct decision of whether extradition was "civil" or
"criminal," and relied instead on the wording of Section 10 of
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,90 which refers to the
prisoner's "right to demand and procure ... legal counsel. ''O1
Habeas Corpus: Prior to 1967, habeas corpus for the purpose of obtaining the release of a person charged with a criminal
offense was characterized as "civil. ' '9

2

Once again, since the

proceeding may result in "incarceration against one's will," it
ought to be treated as "criminal" under the Specht, Gault and
Mempa test. Thus, in Smith V. Bennett,9 3 the United States
Supreme Court treated an indigent prisoner's petition for habeas
corpus as a "criminal" proceeding protected by the Federal Constitution. In Long v. District Court,9 4 the Court also recognized
the "criminal" status of habeas corpus by holding that a state
must furnish a free transcript of a habeas corpus proceeding
to an indigent state prisoner for use on appeal, rejecting Iowa's
contention that habeas corpus was a "civil action." 95
In Gardnerv. California,"° the Supreme Court held that the
denial to an indigent of a free transcript of a state court's habeas
corpus hearing violated the prisoner's constitutional rights.
Contempt of Court: The cases heretofore decided have
classified contempt of court into two categories: (1) criminal
and (2) civil. Criminal contempt involves the imposition of
punishment for offending the dignity of the court as an institution of government'9 7 while civil contempt involves the imposition
of punishment to enforce an order of the court which was made
for the benefit of a party to the proceedings. 98 It is well settled
87 ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 60, §§18-49 (1967).

88 Id. at §27.
89 35 I1l.2d 512, 221 N.E.2d 265 (1966).
90 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 60, §27 (1967).

91 Id.
92 E.g., People v. White, 26 I1. App. 2d 279, 168 N.E.2d 48 (1960).

93 365 U.S. 708 (1961).

U.S. 192 (1966).
95 Id. at 193.
9 393 U.S. 367 (1969).
97See, e.g., O'Brien v. People, 216 Ill.354, 368, 75 N.E. 108, 113-14
(1905).
98 See, e.g., Wilson v. Prochnow, 359 11. 148, 151, 194 N.E. 246, 247
(1934).
94385
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that a proceeding for criminal contempt is a "criminal case." 99 On
civil contempt was, prior to 1967, treated as a
the other hand,
"civil case." 100 But since the proceeding, which was. formerly
denominated as "civil," may result in "incarceration against one's
will," is it not "criminal" under the Specht, Gault and Mempa
test?In cases denominated as "civil contempt," the burden of
proof is on the "accused" contemnor to convince the court that
he'is not guilty.: Since, for failure to meet this burden, he is
fined or imprisoned, the constitutional validity of this procedure,
under the foregoing analysis, is highly questionable.' 1
Furthermore, -included in the so-called "civil contempt"
category are cases involving the execution of "mandatory" court
orders, such as the production of a document or the restoration
of property, the failure of which may result in the imprisonment
of the contemnor for an indefinite period of time. For example,
the court orders a litigant to produce a certain document. The
litigant testifies that he has searched for the document and is
unable to find it. The judge does not believe the testimony of
the accused, holds him in contempt and imposes a sentence that
he remain incarcerated until he produces the document. Under
these circumstances, he may remain in prison for the rest of his
life.'0 2 Likewise, for example, a litigant is a trustee of an heirloom. He testifies that it was stolen from him. The judge does
not believe his testimony, holds him in contempt and imposes A
sentence that he remain incarcerated until he produces the heirloom. Under these circumstances, he may remain in prisonfor
the rest of his life. Are the accused contemnors, in the above
instances, not entitled to trial by jury, protection against selfincrimination and the other constitutional guarantees of the
Federal Bill of Rights?
In Mahan v. Mahan,'0 3 a divorce decree was entered in October of 1966. In January of 1968, an injunction was entered
99

See, e.g., People v.-Barasch, 21 Ill.2d 407, 173 N.E.2d 417 (1961).
In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), the United States Supreme
Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court and held that a person who had
been charged with criminal contempt and sentenced to imprisonment for
24 months was. improperly denied a trial by jury. On the other hand, in
Dylie V. Taylbr Implement 'Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968), where persons
were found guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced to "10 days in jail
and a $50 fine," they were not. entitled to trial by jury because the crime
involved
0 0 fell within the category of "petty" Offenses.
-See H--.FINS; -APPEuALS- AND WRITS oF-ERROR -IN ILLINOIS 61-(11th ed.
1962).
. 101The procedure 'employed' has been that the court issues a rule to
show cause why the respondent should not be held in contempt. Thus, the
burden. in such a proceeding is on the "accused" contemnor.
102 A case involving facts similar to the above example is now pending
in the Illinois Appellate Court, City Savings Ass'n v. Mensik, appedl
docketed, No. 53359, 1st Dist., August 15, 1968.
(abstract only).
103 101 Ill. App. 2d 155, 242 N.E.2d 11 (1968)
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against the defendant restraining him from molesting the plaintiff or her property. Thereafter, a rule to show cause was issued
why the defendant should not be held in contempt for violating
the injunction on April 6, 1968. A hearing was held and the
defendant was adjudged to be in contempt of court and sentenced
to one year in the state penal farm. On appeal, the defendant
relied on Bloom v. Illinois14 and contended that "he was not afforded due process of law in that there was no trial by jury."
The Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District, recognized the
defendant's right of trial by jury in contempt proceedings growing out of the violation of an injunction, but held that the defendant's failure to request a trial by jury in the trial court constituted a waiver of his right to such a trial. The Mahan court
said:
We do not see that the Bloom decision is applicable here for the
reason that the record is devoid of any motion or other timely request by the defendant for a trial by jury. The defendant fully
participated in the proceedings below, offered testimony and crossexamined witnesses who appeared in support of the rule to show
cause. His contention that the proceedings below amount to a deof due process for want of a jury trial thus has a hollow
privation
10 5
ring.
Sanity Hearing: Prior to 1967, a proceeding to determine
whether a person was sane was considered "civil."' 10 6 But since
the proceeding may result in "incarceration against one's will,"
is it not, under the Specht, Gault and Mempa test, "criminal"?
Mental Commitment Proceeding: In People ex rel. Keith
V. Keith,0 7 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a proceeding
which may result in the confinement of a person because of mental illness is a "civil" case. However, since it too is "incarceration against one's will," is it not a "criminal" proceeding protected by the Federal Constitution under the Specht, Gault and
Mempa test?
'In Narcotic Addiction Control Commission V. James,' the
New York Court of Appeals held that detention for three days,
against his will, of a suspected narcotic addict who was charged
with no crime, was not given any notice of the nature of the
proceedings, nor an opportunity to contest the finding upon
which a determination to restrain him of his liberty was predicated, was so contrary to the fundamental notion of fairness, as
to constitute a deprivation of liberty without due process of
104

391 U.S. 194 (1968).

101 Ill. App. 2d 155, 242 N.E.2d 11 (1968) (abstract only, p. 3 memorandum of decision).
See People v. Scott, 326 Ill.
106 ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, §104-2 (1965).
327, 157 N.E.'247 (1927); People v. Kadens, 399 Ill. 394, 78 N.E.2d 289
(1948) ; People v. Carpenter, 13 Ill.2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 100 (1958).
107 38 Ill.2d 405, 231 N.E.2d 387 (1967).
108 22 N.Y.2d 545, 240 N.E.2d 29, 293 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1968).
105
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law, and the subsequent determination that he was an addict,
based almost entirely upon information obtained during the
period of illegal detention, had to be set aside. The highest
court of the State of New York said:
This case presents for our consideration an attack upon the
constitutionality of the procedural and substantive provisions of the
Narcotic Control Act of 1966 as they relate to the compulsory
have neither been charged nor convicted
treatment of addicts10who
9
of criminal activity.
On this appeal appellant argues, first, that the provisions requiring compulsory commitment are unconstitutional for the reason
that they authorize the commitment of a person, who has not been
convicted of any crime, without a showing that he is dangerous to
himself or others or that he has lost his self-control so as to be in
need of institutional confinement." 0
Although we conclude that the State may compel those addicted to narcotic drugs to undergo rehabilitative care at a State
institution under a properly restricted statute, there are several
additional questions regarding the constitutionality of the proceedings which ultimately terminate in a commitment. The appellant
urges that 'the procedure authorized by section 206 of the Mental
Hygiene Law deprived [him] of due process of law.""
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides that no person shall be deprived of liberty without
due process of law. The detention of this appellant, who was
charged with no crime, against his will for a period of three days,
without notice of the nature of the proceeding and an opportunity
to contest the finding upon which the determination to restrain
his liberty was predicated, is contrary to our most fundamental
notions of fairness and constitutes a deprivation of liberty without
due process of law.

,"'

Having concluded that the temporary detention of the appellant violated his constitutional rights, it must necessarily follow
that the subsequent determination that the appellant was an addict, which was based almost entirely on information obtained
during the period of illegal detention, must be set aside. Where
we deal with violations of rights that are so fundamental and
intrusions on individual freedom that are so unwarranted, we
cannot, as the Attorney-General asks us, uphold the subsequent
finding of addiction even though the appellant eventually received
a hearing. The finding, resting as it does on evidence obtained
during the unconstitutional detention of the appellant, cannot
stand.
To summarize, then, we hold that the State may compel an
individual to submit to rehabilitative confinement. We hold, however, that provisions of section 206 of the Mental Hygiene Law as
Id. at 548, 240 N.E.2d at 30,
110 Id. at 550, 240 N.E.2d at 32,
M'Id. at 551, 240 N.E.2d at 32,
112 Id. at 552, 240 N.E.2d at 33,
109

293 N.Y.S.2d
293 N.Y.S.2d
293 N.Y.S.2d
293 N.Y.S.2d

at 533.
at 535.
at 536.
at 537.
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they effect the proceedings leading up to confinement are unconsti-

tutional, and it is this constitutional infirmity which requires a
1 13
reversal here.

Licensed Professions and, Trades:

A number of Illinois

statutes give the Department of Registration and Education the
power to conduct disciplinary proceedings for the revocation of
licenses of physiciansi- dentists, chiropodists, optometrists,: pharmacists, dental hygienists, psychologists, physical therapists,
veterinarians, detectives and detective agencies, detection of deception examiners, structural engineers, architects,_ surveyors,
nurses, social workers, -funeral directors and embalmers, barbers,, beauty culturists, real estate brokers, salesmen, shorthand
reporters and tree experts." 4 But- since the revocation of the
license deprives the licensee of the means of earning a livelihood,
it involves, under the Spevack test, the imposition of a "penalty"
and,, ought to be treated as a "criminal" proceeding. is the licensee, by virtue of the sixth amendment to Ithe Constitution of
the United States, entitled to a trial by jury? Are the various

statutes" which have delegated this power of revocation to an
administrative agency constitutional?CivilService Employees:- Disciplinary proceedings to re'1 3 Id. at 553-54,,240 N.E.2d at 33-34, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 537-38.
It is of -interest to observe that under the Illinois Mental Health Code
of 1967, ILL. REV. STAT. ch 911,§9-4 (1967).,-a person who is subjected to
a mental commitment proceeding is accorded full right of counsel (as a .defendant in a criminal proceeding), and, if he is indigent, counsel is provided
for him free of charge. The statute reads as follows:
At any- hearing under- this Act, the court shall inform the person asserted to be mentally retarded or -to be in need of'mental treatment of
his right to counsel and ask if he desires counsel of his choice to be
summoned or counsel to be appointed by the court, and the court shall
require that such person's request for counsel be complied with and
that in all events each person is represented by counsel. Counsel shall
be allowed time for adequate preparation and shall not be prevented
from conferring with the person at reasonable times nor from making
such reasonable invie tigation 6 the matters'in issue and presenting,
such relevant evidence'at such hearing as he'believes'is necessary to- a
proper, disposition of the proceedings.
.
If the
th court determines that the person asserted to be mentally
retarded or to be in need of mental treatment is indigent, the court
shall appdiit as counsel the public defehder, if available.
2. If the public defender is not available, the court" shall appoint as
counsel an attorney at law licensed by- this State.
3.. Upon the. filing with the court of a verified statement of, legal
services rendered by the attorney appointed for the indigent. person
pursuant to 'paragraph (2) of this Section, the cburt shall allowas
attorney fees, and order the county treasurer of the county'where
. the hearing is held to pay to appointed counsel, a reasonable-fee stated
in the order, not to exceed $75, if no jury, or not to exceed $150 when
there. is a juy.
See also Harris, Mental Illness, Due Process and Lawyers 55,A.B.A.J. 65

(1969).

:*.'I .The..following statites .tre •applicable to the enumerated professions
and vocations: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 5, §177- (1967); ch. 10k; §13 (1967);
ch. 1614, §14.81 (1967) ;: ch. 23, §5312;: (1967); 'ch. 37, §760,(1967); ch. 38,
§§201_17, 202-17 (1967) ;, ch. 91, §§16b.01, 22.16, 35.46, 55.13-5, 62, 72h,
81, 105.13, 124.12-1 (1967) ; ch. 914, §416 -(196.7); ch. 11121-§§73.22, 116.53
(1967); ch. 114 , §8.01 (1967) ; ch. 131', §10 (1967) ; ch. 133, §46 (1967).
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move civil service employees from their positions are by various
Illinois statutes placed in administrative agencies. 115 But since
the proceeding deprives the employee of the privilege which is
the means of earning a livelihood, it involves, under the Spevack
test, the imposition of a "penalty" and is a "criminal" proceeding.
Is a civil service employee, by virtue of the sixth amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, entitled to a trial by jury?
Are the statutes which have delegated this power to an administrative agency constitutional?""
Judges: Rule 51 of the Supreme Court of Illinois' 17 provides
for disciplinary proceedings against judges, which are to be
conducted by a commission, and the commission may suspend
or remove the judge if it finds him guilty of misconduct. That
the draftsmen of the rule treated the proceeding as purely
"civil" is clear from the following provisions: ."It is the-duty of
the respondent to file an answer and to co-operate with the
commision in ascertaining the truth."'",
Where appropriate,
the procedure used in-civil cases may be taken asg a guide to
procedure before the commission."" 9 But since the proceeding
may deprive the accused judge of his office which is the means
of earning a livelihood, it involves, under Spevack, the imposition of a "penalty" and should be treated as a "criminal" proceeding. Should the accused judge, by virtue of the sixth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, be entitled
to a trial by jury? Is rule 51 valid under the Federal Constitution?
Paternity-Act: A proceeding under the Illinois Paternity
Act 1 20 to establish that the defendant is the natural father of an
illegitimate child and to compel the father to support the child
21
provides for enforcement by imprisonment of the defendant.
Prior to 1967, the proceeding was treated as "civil."' 12 2 But since
the proceeding may result in "incarceration against one's will,"
should it not be treated as "criminal" under the Specht, Gault
and Mempa test?
Malice Gist of Action: In tort cases where there is a
115 Drezner v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 398 111. 219, 75 N.E.2d 303 (1947);
Harrison v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 1 Il.2d 137, 115 N.E.2d 521 (1953); DeGrazio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 31 Ill.2d 482, 202 N.E.2d 522 (1964). 116 See Greco v. State Police Merit Bd., 105 Ill. App. 2d 186, 245 N.E.2d
99 (1969).
117 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §51 (1967).

110A, §51(c) (1967).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §51(d) (1967).
120 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1061, §§55, 60 (1967).
118 ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
119

Id.
See FINS at 162.
In People ex rel Adams v. Sanes, 41 Ill.2d 381, 243 N.E.2d 233 (1968),
the Illinois Supreme Court recognized the defendant's constitutional right
to counsel in a proceeding under the Illinois Paternity Act, but the court
found as a fact that the defendant had expressly waived that right in the
trial court.
121
12
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finding and judgment that "malice is the gist of the action," the
judgment may be enforced by a body execution, that is, imprisonment of the defendant.123 But since the proceeding may result
in "incarceration against one's will," should it not be treated,
under the Specht, Gault and Mempa test, as "criminal"?
In Wright v. Crawford,12 4 decided by the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky (the highest court of that state), the facts were
as follows: The plaintiff brought a "civil" action for malicious
assault against the defendant seeking to recover compensatory
and punitive damages. The defendant appeared in the trial
court pro se. The jury assessed $526.80 as compensatory damages and $2,000.00 as punitive damages. Under Kentucky law
this "civil" judgment could be enforced by imprisonment. The
defendant, Wright, pro se, then filed an original mandamus in
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky against the trial judge and
the clerk of the trial court to provide the defendant with counsel
and a transcript for appeal, free of charge, asserting that he was
indigent. The Kentucky Court of Appeals granted the mandamus and said:
Without entering upon full consideration or discussion of
whether 'due process' demands appointment of counsel for an indigent litigant in a civil case, we are persuaded that the statutorily
permitted imprisonment of Wright (KRS 426, 390) brings this
case within the rationale of the rule applicable to appointment
of counsel for litigants in criminal cases. We are unable to perceive a valid distinction between the criminal judgment which
imposes jail sentence and the civil judgment which does the same.
The litigant's 'liberty' is as surely impaired by one as the other.
Therefore, for the purposes at bar, if it is ultimately adjudicated
that Wright is a pauper, he has the same rights as an indigent in
a criminal case. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct.
792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733, requires appointment of counsel; Douglas v. People of State of California,372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct.
814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811, assures counsel on appeal. Griffin v. People
of State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 guarantees a transcript. Cf. Davenport v. Winn., Ky., 385 S.W.2d
185.
Although the specific prayer of the present petition is imperfectly worded, the plain import of the entire procedure is Wright's
counsel-less effort to be adjudged a pauper and afforded counsel
on appeal with an adequate record.
It is ordered that the trial court afforded Wright a hearing
on the issue of his indigence, and if it is adjudged that he is
indigent then counsel for him on appeal shall be assigned by the
trial court and record and transcript shall be furnished to him,
125
cost free, for use on appeal.

Punitive Damages: In cases involving intentional torts,
123

124

ch. 77, §5 (1967).
401 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966).
ILL. REV. STAT.

r-.5 Id. at 49.
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such as assault and battery, libel and slander, or fraud, punitive
damages may be allowed. 12 6 Similarly, under the Illinois Antitrust Act,2 1 "three times the amount of actual damages" may
be recovered" 28 which is another form of punitive damages. The
very word "punitive" means "as a punishment." It is of interest
to observe that the same facts which subject a defendant to the
payments of treble damages make him liable to a prosecution
by the State of Illinois for a crime punishable "by a fine of up 1to9
$50,000, or by imprisonment not to exceed six months, or both." 2
Since the defendant, in these situations, is being punished by
being compelled to pay more than the actual damages which the
plaintiff has suffered, the defendant is subjected to the imposiiton of a "penalty" or fine." Under the test of Spevack, Camara
and See, should it not be treated as a "criminal" proceeding?
DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO SAFEGUARDS OF
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

Compulsory Pleading by Defendant: If the proceeding
involved is "criminal," then compelling the defendant to answer
the complaint or allowing the allegations of the complaint to
stand admitted if the defendant fails to do So 1 3 0 is self-incrimination in direct violation of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Are Rules 51 (c) 131 and 751 (c) 132 of
the Supreme Court of Illinois, which, respectively, require an
accused judge and an accused lawyer to answer the complaint,
constitutionally valid?
Default Judgment: If a defendant in a civil proceeding
fails to appear and answer the complaint, the plaintiff's allegations stand admitted and a judgment by default is entered against
the defendant. On the other hand, in a criminal case, the defendant may stand mute and the plaintiff must prove each and
every material element of the case. Therefore, judgment by
default does not exist in a criminal proceeding. Since some
legal proceedings, which were previously considered as "civil"
are to be treated as "criminal," should not default judgments
in such cases be abolished and, if entered, be considered as a
nullity?
Right to Counsel: The sixth amendment 1 3' to the Constitution of the United States guarantees a defendant in a criminal
126 See, e.g., Gass v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 357 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1966) ;
Miller v. Simon. 100 Ill. App. 2d 6, 241 N.E.2d 697 (1968) ; Lorillard v. Field
Enterprises, Inc., 65 Ill. App. 2d 65, 213 N.E.2d 1 (1965).
127 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §60-7 (1967).
128

129
130

Id.
Id. at §60-6.
See ILL. REv.

STAT.

ch 110, §40 (1967);

R. Civ. P. 8.
13' ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A,
132 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A,
133 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

§51(c) (1967).
§751(c) (1967).

FED.

R. Civ. P. 7;

FED.
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ease "the Assistance of Counsel for his defense" and indigent
defendants are entitled to have counsel appointed for them by
the court. 3 4 Since some legal proceedings, which, prior to 1967
Were considered as "civil," are now to be treated' as "criminal,"
should courts not be required to appoint lawyers for indigent
defendants in such cases?
Calling Defendant as Witness: Prior to 1967, the Supreme
Court of Illinois had held that in a disciplinary proceeding against
a lawyer (which was treated as "civil") the prosecution may
call the accused lawyer as an adverse witness under section 60135
of the Civil Practice Act. 136 However, if the proceeding involved

is "criminal," then compelling the defendant to testify is a clear
violation of the fifth amendment'3 7 to the Constitution of the
United States which provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
."M

This is precisely what Spevack v. Klein decided.

Production of Documents by Defendant: In a "civil" proceeding, the defendant may be compelled to produce documents
for inspection prior to trial and as evidence at the trial under
rules 204, 214 and 237 of the Supreme Court of Illinois. 3 9

But

if the prodeeding involved is "criminal" then compelling the
defendant to produce documents constitutes -self-incrimination
in direct violation of the fifth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. This again is precisely what Spevack v.
Klein decided.
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: In civil cases, the plaintiff
need prove his case only by a preponderance of the evidence.
On the other hand, in criminal cases, the prosecution has the
burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore,
in a proceeding, which, prior to 1967 was considered "civil"
but is now treated as "criminal," the prosecution must prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and not merely by a preponderance of the evidence.140

Furthermore, "[i]t is always the

duty of the court to resolve the circumstances in evidence upon
a theory of innocence rather than upon a theory of guilt where
it is reasonably possible to do

So. ' '

4

In addition,

"[w]here

two equally reasonable hypotheses exist, the law requires the
adoption of the one which is consonant with the innocence of the
.2
accused.'

1

1.14 Eg., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
135 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §60 (1967).

16 In re Eaton, 14 Ill.2d 338, 152 N.E.2d 850 (1958); In re Royal, 29
Ill.2d 458, 194 N.E.2d 242 (1963).
117 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13 Id.
139 ILL. REV. STAT. eh. 110A, §§204, 217, 237 (1967).
140

141
142

In re Urbasek, 38 Ill.2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967).
People v. Bentley, 357 Ill. 82, 99, 191 N.E. 230, 237 (1934).
People v. Ibom, 25 Ill.2d 585, 594, 185 N.E.2d 690, 696 (1962).
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Trial by Jury: The sixth amendment 143 to the Constitution
of the United States provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury . ..
'144
If the proceeding involved is "criminal," the accused must be granted a trial by
jury. 145 Since a proceeding which may result in the deprivation
of a privilege or the revocation of a license which is the means
of earning a livelihood is a "criminal" prosecution, is not the
constitutional validity of statutes and rules of court providing
for administrative hearings of accused lawyers, judges, physicians, dentists, pharmacists, engineers, architects, surveyors,
real estate brokers, and insurance brokers, without trial by

jury, questionable?
Double Jeopardy: Prior to 1967, it was common practice
to proceed with disciplinary proceedings against lawyers who
had been criminally convicted for income tax evasion. The
proceedings resulted, in most cases, in a suspension from the
practice of law for several years.14 6 Since disciplinary proceedings were, prior to 1967, considered "civil," there was no
"double jeopardy" involved. But now that Spevack v. Klein
has determined that depriving a person of a license which is
the means of earning a livelihood constitutes the imposition of
a "penalty," the disciplinary proceeding resulting in a suspension
involves additional punishment (that is, a second "penalty") for
the same tax evasion for which the defendant has already paid
a penalty in the criminal conviction.1 47 Does this constitute
"double jeopardy" prohibited by the fifth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States? It must not be overlooked
that if the convicted person is legally or morally unfit to engage
143

144

U.S. CONST.

Id.

amend. VI.

145 The United States Constitution guarantees trial by jury in criminal
cases which do not fall within the category of "petty" offenses. Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968);
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968).
146 See In re Teitelbaum, 13 Ill.2d 586, 150 N.E.2d 873, cert. denied,
358 U.S. 881 (1958) (three year suspension); In re Greenberg, 21 Ill.2d
170, 171 N.E.2d 615 (1961) (two year suspension) ; In re Revzan, 33 Ill.2d
197, 210 N.E.2d 519 (1965) (two year suspension) ; In re Sullivan, 33 Ill.2d
548, 213 N.E.2d 257 (1965) (three year suspension) ; In re Shavin, 40 Ill.2d
254, 239 N.E.2d 790 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1019 (1969) (two year
suspension).
147 Formerly, it was held that where the same act constitutes a violation
of state and federal law, two prosecutions may be had without violating the
double jeopardy principle. Now that the "double jeopardy" prohibition of
the fifth amendment is applicable to state as well as to federal prosecutions,
double punishment for the same act is abhorrent to the constitutional protection. Furthermore, the former distinction, which was based on the source
of the law involved, is a play on semantics, grossly unrealistic, and violates
the true spirit of due process of law. A sovereign should not be allowed to
"foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels." N.A.A.C.P.
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
The "source of law" distinction between state and federal origin has
already been rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States in Murphy

228

The John MarshallJournalof Practiceand Procedure

[Vol. 2:205

in the practice of law, he should be disbarred for professional
incompetency. But suspension is imposed as a deterrent or as
retaliation and is purely penal in nature.
Additionally, prior to 1967, the law was that a lawyer who
had been indicted for the commission of a criminal act, tried,
found not guilty and acquitted, could, nevertheless, be subjected to
disciplinary proceedings for the commission of the very same
act of which he had been previously found not guilty and acquitted. 14 But now that Spevack v. Klein has determined that
depriving a person of a license which is the means of earning

a livelihood constitutes the imposition of a "penalty," does the
disciplinary proceeding constitute "double jeopardy" prohibited
by the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States?
Statute of Limitations: Prior to 1967, no statute of limitations was applicable to disciplinary proceedings.1 49 But now
v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). In Murphy, persons had been
subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission.
Although, they were granted immunity from prosecution under state laws,
they refused to testify "on the grounds that the answers might tend to incriminate them under federal law, to which the grant of immunity did not
purport to extend." 378 U.S. at 54. The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed prior rulings on this point and said: "We hold that the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness
against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal
witness against incrimination under state as well as federal law." 378 U.S.
at 77-78.
[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not
be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used
in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him.
Id. at 79.
The "source of law" distinction between state and federal origin was
also rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968)
(where the Court held that the fifth amendment's protection against selfincrimination available to a person whose compliance with a federal tax
statute would incriminate the taxpayer under a state statute) ; Lee v.
Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968) (where the Court held that evidence which had
been obtained in violation of a federal statute was not admissible in a state
prosecution).
It is of interest to note that in disciplinary proceedings based on a federal conviction, the respondent is not allowed to contradict the purported
facts upon which the federal conviction is based, as "[t]he record of conviction of respondent is conclusive of his guilt and it has been established in
this State that we cannot go behind such record." In re Teitelbaum, 13 Ill.2d
586, 590, 150 N.E.2d 873, 875, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 881 (1958). In the
disciplinary proceeding, the respondent is limited to the initroduction of
"facts and circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of each case in an
effort to determine an appropriate penalty." In re Sullivan, 33 Ill.2d 548,
554, 213 N.E.2d 257, 260 (1966). The conviction is "conclusive evidence of
guilt; and that such conviction per se justifies disciplinary action .
and the court is limited "to consider the facts and circumstances in aggravation or mitigation in each case in determining the penalty to be imposed."
In re Shavin, 40 Ill.2d 254, 255, 239 N.E.2d 790, 791 (1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1019 (1969). The accused lawyer is thus deprived of an opportunity to
prove himself not guilty in the state proceeding, but is nevertheless subjected
to a second punishment. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 546 (1968). This
again4 violates
the true spirit of due process of law.
8
L In re Browning 23 Ill.2d 483, 179 N.E.2d 14 (1962).
149 People ex rel. Wealy v. Hooper, 218 Ill. 313, 75 N.E. 896 (1905)
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that Spevack v. Klein has determined that depriving a person
of a license which is the means of earning a livelihood constitutes
the imposition of a "penalty," does not the statute of limitations
apply as in other criminal cases ?15o
Appeal by Plaintiff After Trial on Merits: In Illinois
"civil" proceedings, both plaintiff and defendant have a constitutional right of appeal.15 1 On the other hand, the Illinois
Constitution provides that "after a trial on the merits in ' a criminal case, no appeal shall lie from a judgment of acquittal. 1 2
If the proceeding involved was, prior to 1967, "civil" but is now
"criminal," the plaintiff or prosecution may not appeal from a
judgment in favor of the accused after a trial on the merits.
OBJECTIVE RE-EXAMINATION NECESSARY

Habit is a very powerful resistant to change. The human
thinking process is strongly dominated by the habit of considering problems from a particular point of view for a long time
and unconsciously accepting that point of view as the correct
one. As a result, judges who have been exposed to a certain
environment bring with them thinking habits which are beneficial or detrimental to the future development of the law.
Change in approach to a legal problem is necessarily the result
of conscious effort, a task which very few persons welcome.
Consequently, judges who have formed the habit of treating a
particular procedure as "civil" are reluctant to consider it as
"criminal."
Furthermore, the new approach may require a
change in the structure of the legal system, such as from "trial
by committee" or "trial by commission" to "trial by jury." The
result is that habit makes human beings adhere to the old and
reject the new. These obstacles may make the road ahead a
difficult one.
In the light of recent federal constitutional developments
and the exhortation of the Supreme Court of the United States
that "a State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional
rights by mere labels ' 15 3 the legal profession must awaken to
the realization that the difference between "civil" and "criminal"
cannot rest on arbitrary labeling by courts and legislatures, but
requires careful re-examination of legal consequences to distinguish reality from fiction.
People ex rel. Stead v. Phipps, 261 11. 576, 104 N.E. 144 (1914) ; People
ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Sherwin, 364 Ill. 350, 4 N.E.2d 477 (1936).
150 Section 3-5 of the Criminal Code of 1961, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §3-5
(1967), provides that prosecution for an offense "must be commenced within
3 years after the commission of the offense if it is a felony or within one
year and six months after the commission if it is a misdemeanor."
151 ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§5, 7 (1964).
152 ILL. CONST. art. VI, §7 (1964).
1 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).

